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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in principle offers unconditional security based on the laws of
physics. Continuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution has the potential for high-key-rate and
low-cost implementations using standard telecom components. Despite tremendous theoretical and
experimental progress in continuous variable quantum key distribution, the security has not been
rigorously established for most current continuous variable quantum key distribution systems that
have imperfections. Among the imperfections, intensity fluctuation is a significant principal problem
affecting security. In this paper, we provide simple security proofs for continuous variable quantum
key distribution systems with an intensity fluctuating sources. Specifically, depending on device
assumptions in the source, the imperfect systems are divided into two cases for security proofs.
Our proofs are simple to implement without any hardware adjustment for the current continuous
variable quantum key distribution system. Besides, we show some compensation schemes for the
decoding flaws for an outlook.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution(QKD) allows two distant parties, to share a common string of secret data [1–3]. Based
on the laws of quantum mechanics, QKD offers information-theoretical security. QKD has aroused much interest
in both theoretical protocol and experimental demonstration, because it is considered the first application of quan-
tum information science to reach commercial maturity. For example, the implementation of discrete variable (DV)
QKD protocols including satellite-to-ground QKD [4] and chip-based QKD [5–7] have demonstrated the potential
for commercial applications in the filed of quantum information. Besides, twin-field QKD has been proposed to
outperform the well-known rate-loss limit [8] and largely extend transmission limits[9]. Compared to DV protocols,
continuous-variable (CV) protocols have the potential for high-key rate and low-cost implementations using current
standard telecom components such as homodyne detectors [3]. Recent continuous variable quantum key distribution
experiment demonstrates the transmission over a long distance beyond 100 km [10].
Despite the enormous progress in the field of QKD, the most important question in quantum communication is
always how secure QKD really is. For example, are QKD systems secure when implemented with practical devices?
Fortunately, measurement-device-independent QKD [11] can remove all imperfections and security-loopholes in the
measurement devices, and therefore we only need to consider the imperfections in the source devices. Imperfect
source, such as the correlated intensity fluctuations in optical pulses [12] and setting-choice-independently correlated
light sources [13], has been recently analyzed in DV QKD systems. However, the security research concerning CV
QKD with imperfect source has fallen behind that of its discrete-variable cousin. For instance, almost all existing CV
QKD proofs require a perfect state preparation, i.e., Gaussian modulation, which cannot be guaranteed in a practical
CVQKD system such as Gaussian-modulated coherent-state (GMCS) QKD system [14]. Among the imperfections in
the source, intensity fluctuation is a significant principal problem affecting the perfect Gaussian states. Therefore, in
this work we study intensity fluctuations in practical CV QKD systems. Our intensity fluctuation model is an arbitrary
distributed random variable with a unit mean value. Depending on whether the intensity fluctuation information is
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2accessible or not to Alice, our security analysis of a QKD system can be generally divided into two cases given the
two divice assumptions : Alice 1) can and 2)cannot monitor intensity fluctuations for every pulse.
In this work, we prove the security for the two cases based on different techniques. Particularly, in case 1) , because
Alices information can help modify her data, the security proof is based on the integrating over the distribution of
intensity fluctuation. Besides, a refined data analysis is straightforward to be developed to defend possible attacks
based on intensity side information. In case (2), Alice can not exactly control signals for every pulse. Depending on
whether Eve has the intensity side information, we divide the case (2) into two subcases (2A) and (2B). In subcase
(2A), we prove the security based on a virtual implementation of classical data processing. In case (2B), we apply the
concept of tagging, previous developed for DV QKD in [15] , to the case of CV QKD. Specifically, we divide up signals
into two distinct sets, untagged and tagged. Untagged signals are those whose intensities fall inside a prescribed region
whereas tagged signals are those whose intensities might fall outside the prescribed region. In the actual protocol,
the QKD system users do not need to know whether each signal is tagged or untagged. They only need to be able
to set a bound for untagged signals, which would lead to the security of their generated key. Moreover, given the
distribution of intensities fluctuations, the users could obtain the probability of untagged signals and further optimize
the fraction of untagged signals for the secret key rate. In the end, our proofs for all case (1) and (2) are simple to
implement without any hardware adjustment for the current continuous variable quantum key distribution system.
Alice and Bob can choose different security proofs to generate the secret key based on their device assumptions.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec.II, we explain our model for the intensity fluctuations. In Sec.III, we divide
CVQKD systems into two cases based on different device assumptions in the source. In Sec.IV, we briefly review the
secret key rate for an ideal CVQKD system. In Sec.V, we prove the security for case (1) and propose a refined data
analysis to increase the maximum transmission distance. In Sec.VI, we divide the case (2) into two subcases (2A) and
(2B). We prove the security of (2A) based on a virtal implementaion of classical data processing and (2B) based on
untagged Gaussian states. In Sec.VII, we provide an outlook for decoding flaws of CV QKD system. We show some
feasible countermeasures for the decoding flaws. In Sec.VIII, we provide concluding remarks.
II. INTENSITY FLUCTUATION MODEL
Here, we define our model for experimental intensity fluctuations. For example, suppose that a desired pulse
intensity is IA, however, Alice actually prepares a state with the intensity of d∗IA. We denote d as a random variable
to characterize the intensity fluctuation, with mean value Ed and variance Vd. This intensity fluctuation can be caused
by power fluctuations of a laser and imperfect intensity modulators [16]. In this paper, for simplicity, we assume the
following conditions of the random variable d:
1) d is an identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable.
2) d has a mean value Ed and a variance Vd, where Ed is 1.
3) d can be arbitrary distributed with the condition 1) and 2).
4) d is independent with the pulse intensity IA.
5) the probability distribution function of d can be obtained before the experiment by testing the source device.
6) the probability distribution function of d will not change during the QKD transmission.
Here, these conditions are assumed to simplify our model for experimental intensity fluctuations. Conditions 1)-4)
are the intrinsic constraints and assumptions for the intensity fluctuations. A strong hypothesis here is that condition
4), which could be violated when the intensities are very small. However, since in most current CV QKD system, optical
attenuators are used to attenuate the strong pulse which is the output of the modulator. Therefore, the condition 4)
can be guaranteed by these strong pulse. Conditions 5)-6) are the assumptions for system characterization, which is
required before QKD transmission. Fig 1 shows two probability distribution functions (PDF) of d, such as Gaussian
distribution and uniform distribution.
III. CV QKD SYSTEMS BASED ON INTENSITY FLUCTUATION SIDE INFORMATION
Fig. 2 shows that, with the intensity fluctuation side information, QKD system can be divided into two cases for
security proof. To fairly compare the results, an ideal CVQKD system is added as the baseline case (0) for benchmarks.
Here, following [15] we introduce a hypothetical party Fred, who controls the intensity fluctuations d for every optical
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FIG. 1: Arbitrary probability density function (PDF) of d. For example, we present Gaussian distribution and
uniform distribution here.
pulse, e.g., the intensity fluctuation can be controlled by temperature drift. Through secure communication, Fred
would choose to reveal the value to Alice. In total, there are two cases:
(1) Fred discloses the actual value of d to Alice ;
(2) Fred does not disclose the actual value of d to Alice.
In both cases, because the actual pulse intensity is d∗IA, the actual encoded Gaussian random variable now becomes
to
√
dXA and Alice sends out a mode Aˆ1=0ˆ+
√
dXA. In cases (1), Alice has access to the intensity fluctuation values
d and can further revise her data from XA to
√
dXA for every pulse. we provide a security proof based on the
superadditon of secret key rate. Besides, A refined data analysis is proposed to defend all possible attacks based on
the intensity fluctuation side information. In the case (2) , Alice does not have access to the intensity fluctuation
values d. Depending on whether Eve has the intensity fluctuation side information, we divide the case (2) into two
subcases for security proof.
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(2) d is not disclosed to Alice
FIG. 2: Here, practical CV QKD systems can be divided into two cases based on the Alice’s information about
intensity fluctuations. One ideal case (0) is added for comparison. In case (0), CV QKD system does not have any
intensity fluctuations. In case(1), Alice can monitor the intensity fluctuations. In case (2), Alice cannot monitor the
intensity fluctuations. There is no restriction for Eve to have the intensity fluctuation side information. Here, Tc and
εc are, respectively, the channel transmittance and excess noise between Alice and Bob. η and vel are the the
detection efficiency and electronic noise of homodyne detector.
IV. SECURITY PROOF FOR CASE 0
Here, we briefly review the security proof for ideal CV QKD system. Because the security against coherent attacks
can be reduced to that against collective attacks by using de Finetti representation theorem for infinite dimensions
4[17], we only consider asymptotic security against collective attack for simplicity. Given reverse reconciliation com-
munication, the asymptotic secret key rate is given by the Devetak-Winter fourlmula [18–20]:
R0=βIAB−χBE (1)
where β is the reverse reconciliation efficiency, IAB is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and χBE is the
mutual Holevo information between Bob and Eve. Given parameter estimation of transmittance T and excess noise
ε, the computation for IAB and χBE can be found on the appendix.
V. SECURITY PROOF FOR CASE 1
In case (1), the security proof is based on two conclusions: a) strong superadditivity of secret key rate ; b) the
central limit theorem.
Suppose Alice and Bob share n modes joint state ρA1,2,...nB1,2,...n , and Alice has the intensity side information dk.
The secret key rate for this joint state can be shown as
R1=
1
n
R(ρA1,2,...nB1,2,...n)≥
1
n
n∑
k=1
R(ρAkBk|dk) (2)
→
∫ +∞
−∞
PDF (d)R0(d,T )∆d
where PDF (d) is the probability distributing function of d.
In the first line, we use the superaddition of secret key rate from [21]. Then in second line, we argue that by the
central limit theorem, the sum over all reduced modes converges to the average of its probability density function.
Note that here in case (1), Alice has access to the intensity fluctuation values d and can further revise her data from
XA to
√
dXA for each pulse.
A. Improving the maximum transmission distance for case 1 by refined data analysis
In case (1), because Alice can obtain the intensity fluctuation information for each pulse, we propose that a simple
refined data analysis can be adopted by Alice to improve the maximum distance and defend possible attack based on
intensity fluctuation.
Here, we describe a refined data analysis process as below: (1)Based on the probability distribution function of
d, Alice will divide d into a number of sets with equal probability. (2) Alice and Bob will perform the parameter
estimation individually for each set, obtaining the channel transmittance and excess noise and verifying that if the
channel transmittance matches with that from another set. This process is to defend any possible attack for Eve
based on intensity fluctuation side information. (3) For certain sets, if the key rate will be zero or less than zero,
Alice and Bob will simply drop all the data from such sets.
After refined data analysis, the secret key rate can be shown as
R1R=
∫ +∞
−∞
PDF (d)max{R0(d,T ),0}∆d (3)
TABLE I: Evaluation parameters for GMCS QKD [18, 22]
η εc vel VA β
0.60 0.02 0.02 18 95.6
Fig 3 shows the simulation result for the secret key rate R0, R1 and R1R. We use the parameters listed in Table I,
where η and vel are, respectively, the detection efficiency and electronic noise of homodyne detector, εc is the excess
5noise in the channel, VA is the modulation variance and β is the reverse reconciliation efficiency. In Fig 3(a), we
choose the probability density function of d to be an uniform distribution from 0.9 to 1.1. In Fig 3 (b), we choose the
probability density function of d to be an uniform distribution from 0.8 to 1.2. Through simulation, we find that the
secret key rate R1 is approximately same as R0. By refined data analysis, the maximum transmission distance can
be improved from 94km to 130km in Fig 3 (a), while from 94 km to 199km in Fig 3(b). This maximum transmission
distance improvement is expectable, since the refined data analysis can be regarding as a pre-selection of optimal
Gaussian states for long distance.
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FIG. 3: Here, we compare the secret key rate, R0,R1 and R1R. In fig 3(a), the intensity fluctuation model is an
uniform distribution from 0.9 to 1.1. The secret key rate R1 is approximately same as the key rate R0 for ideal CV
QKD system. In fig 3(b), the intensity fluctuation model is an uniform distribution from 0.8 to 1.2. It is clearly
demonstrated that both maximum transmission distances can be improved by refined data analysis.
VI. SECURITY PROOF FOR CASE 2
In case (2), Alice does not know the intensity fluctuation value d, and key rate integration such as Eq.(2)and Eq.(3)
cannot be applied to the case (2) anymore. On the other hand, Eve can possibly have the intensity fluctuation side
information and exploit a strategy to attack based on this side information and the possible refined data analysis is
no longer applicable. Now the question arises: how to calculate the secret key rate when Alice cannot exactly control
the intensity and has no intensity fluctuation side information fore each pulse? In the following section, we will first
divide the case 2 into two subcases for security proof depending on whether Eve has the intensity side information.
A. Security proof for case (2A)
In this section, we consider the case (2A): Eve has no intensity side information. As shown in Fig 4, for each pulse,
Alice also has no intensity side information and can only record the data XA. Therefore, a classical data processing
to map
√
dXA to XA can be virtually implemented by Alice. By considering reverse reconciliation, this classical
processing will not affect Eve’s information about Bob’s measurement results. With the Bob’s recording data XB ,
The secret key rate can be shown as
R2A=βI(XA,XB)−χ(XB ,E)|√dXA (4)
where I(XA,XB) is the mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s classical recording data XA and XB , and
χ(XB ,E)|√dXA is the Holevo mutual information between Bob and Eve given the actual input pulse before the
channel. Here, I(XA,XB) can be directly obtained from the data sets, while an upper bound for χ(XB ,E)|√dXA is
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FIG. 4: Here, we consider the case (2A) that Eve also has no intensity side information. Therefore, Eve can only
manipulate in the channel. Due to intensity fluctuation, Alice will have a recording data mismatch, which we regard
as a virtual classical data processing.
needed. Here, we use the fact that the Holevo information χ(XB ,E)|√dXA between Eve’s and Bob’s classical variables,
is maximized when then the state ρAB shared by Alice and Bob is Gaussian [21]. By calculating the mean value and
variance of
√
dXA, we can obtain the bound that
χ(XB ,E)|√dXA≤χ(XGB ,E)|XGA (5)
where XGA and X
G
B are, respectively, the Gaussian random variable with the same first and second moments as XA
and XB .
B. the secret key rate for case 2A
In this section, we will estimate the equivalent transmittance Ts and excess noise εs for the virtual classical data
processing in the source and then compute the secret key rate. According to the Appendix C, the equivalent Ts and
εs can be expressed as
Ts=(1−1
8
Vd)
2, (6)
εs=
1
4
VAVd,
In addition to the channel transmittance Tc and excess noise εc, Alice and Bob would estimate an overall transmit-
tance T and excess noise ε such that
T=TsTc, (7)
ε=εc/Ts+
1
4
VaVd
Fig 5 shows the secret key rate for case 2A. We still use the channel and detector parameters listed in Table I. In
fig 5(a), we compute the secret key rates for the uniform distributed intensity fluctuation. Even if the pulse intensity
fluctuate 5%, the maximum transmission distance will still drop about 10km. In fig 5(b), the secret key rates are
obtained for the Gaussian distributed intensity fluctuation. The variances of Gaussian distribution vary from 0 to
10−2. When the variance increases to 10−2, the maximum transmission distance will decrease by about 40km. In
other words, when the standard deviation for Gaussian distribution is 10%, the maximum transmission distance will
drop a lot.
C. Security proof for case (2B)
In this section, we consider case (2B) that Eve has intensity side information. Before we jump into security proof,
we firstly define the untagged Gaussian state. Here, we apply the concept of ”tagging”[15] to the case of CV QKD.
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FIG. 5: Here, we compute the secret key rates for two intensity fluctuation models. (a)The secret key rates versus
transmission distance for different intensity fluctuation models of uniform distribution. (b)The secret key rates
versus transmission distance for different intensity fluctuation models of Gaussian distribution.
Suppose Alice sends out n Gaussian modulated coherent pulses to Bob and each pulse has a intensity fluctuation
value di. However, Alice has no information about the intensity fluctuation value for each pulse, and Alice can only
record data set di=1. Now we define the Gaussian modulated coherent states with intensity fluctuation value di<1 as
untagged Gaussian states. It is easy to verify that when Alice sends out a stronger pulse than what she is supposed
to send, Alice and Bob will definitely overestimate the secret key rate by underestimating the channel loss and excess
noise. Here, we define the untagged Gaussian states to be the output states from which Alice and Bob will not
overestimate the secret key rate. As shown in Fig. 6, the Gaussian states associated with d<1 are untagged.
d
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FIG. 6: Here, we apply untagged Gaussian states idea to the intensity fluctuation distribution.
Therefore, we can introduce an cutoff dmax based on intensity fluctuation probability distribution function. As
depicted in Fig 7, if Alice chooses a cutoff dmax, the Gaussian states associated with lower intensities than dmaxIA
would always be untagged. Then the probability to get untagged Gaussian states can be expressed as
ps=
∫ dmax
−∞
PDF(x)dx (8)
Note that a modified QKD protocol is needed to implement an optimal cutoff for CVQKD. The modified protocol
only requires different data recording process on the state preparation stage while maintaining the same output states.
In other words, suppose Alice desires to encode XA and the actual encoding is
√
dXA, Alice should always record the
data as
XA′=
√
dmaxXA (9)
8d
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FIG. 7: Here, we apply a cutoff dmax to increase the probability of untagged Gaussian states.
rather than XA for each pulse.
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FIG. 8: Here, we show the CVQKD system with untagged and tagged Gaussian states. In Fig 3 (a), untagged states
are always secure because we conservatively assume the attenuation from a virtual mode Aˆ0 to a actual output Aˆ1
can be controlled by Eve. In Fig 3 (b), tagged states are insecure if we consider the same attenuation mentioned
before is controlled by Eve.
Fig 8 shows the CVQKD system with untagged and tagged Gaussian states. In Fig 8(a), an untagged Gaussian
state is always secure for Alice. Here, we conservatively assume the attenuation from a stronger pulse A0 to a weaker
pulse A1 can be controlled by Eve. In Fig 8(b), for each tagged signals, Alice encodes in a stronger intensity than
a threshold value, following GLLP security proof [15] , we conservatively assume that tagged signals are insecure.
Therefore, we only consider the secret key rate extracted from untagged Gaussian state.
Suppose that a fraction ps of the pulse emitted by the source are untagged by Eve. The secret key for direct
reconciliation can be extracted from untagged Gaussian state at asymptotic rate [15]
RD2B=psH(XA′)−H(XA′ |XB)−χA′E,ps (10)
=IA′B−(1−ps)H(XA′)−χA′E,ps (11)
The secret key for reverse reconciliation can be shown as
RR2B=psH(XB)−H(XB |XA′)−χBE,ps (12)
=psH(XB)−[H(XB)−H(XA′)+H(XA′ |XB)]−χBE,ps
=IA′B−(1−ps)H(XB)−χBE,ps
where XA′ and XB are Alice’s and Bob’s recording data, psH(XA′) and psH(XB′) is the differential entropy used to
generate the secret key rate depending on direct reconciliation or reverse reconciliation, H(XA′ |XB) and H(XB |XA′)
is the conditional differential entropy for error correction, χA′E,ps is the Holevo information between Alice and Eve
for the untagged states, and χBE,ps is the Holevo information between Bob and Eve for the untagged states. The
Holevo information between Alice/Bob and Eve should be eliminated by privacy amplification process. H(XA′) and
H(XA′ |XB) and H(XB) can be directly obtained by Alice and Bob’s encoding and measurement results. Here we
need to find a bound for the Holevo information. Given the reconciliation efficiency β, the secret key rate can be
9shown as
RD2B=βIA′B−(1−ps)H(XA′)−χA′E,ps (13)
RR2B=βIA′B−(1−ps)H(XB)−χBE,ps
Mathematically, it can be showed that Holevo information is monotonic increasing on the domain of d. Physically,
when the input pulse has a stronger intensity, Eve can obtain more information about Alice’s and Bob’s recording
results. Therefore, for the untagged states, the Holevo information can be bounded
χBE,ps≤psχBE , (14)
χA′E,ps≤psχA′E ,
where χA′E and χBE are the Holevo mutual information between Alice/Bob and Eve estimated from Alice’s and
Bob’s recording results XA′ and XB .
D. The secret key rate for case 2B
In this section, we will estimate the equivalent transmittance Ts and excess noise εsm. According to the Appendix
C, the equivalent Ts and εs can be expressed as
Ts=(1−1
8
Vd)
2/dmax, (15)
εs=
1
4
VAVddmax,
In addition to the channel transmittance Tc and excess noise εc, Alice and Bob would estimate an overall transmit-
tance T and excess noise ε such that
T=TsTc, (16)
ε=εc/Ts+
1
4
VaVddmax
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FIG. 9: Here, we optimize the secret key rate for uniform distribution. (a) Optimal secret key rate versus
transmission distance for different uniform distributions. (b) Optimal dmax versus transmission distance for different
uniform distributions.
For the secret key rate evaluation, we compare the secret key rates for two intensity fluctuation model: Gaussian
distribution and uniform distribution. We still use the parameters in the table I. For the optimization, if we increase
the dmax, ps will be increased while Ts will decrease. We try to optimize dmax to get the maximum secret key rates.
10
Fig 9 shows the key rate optimization results for the uniform distribution. Here, we consider the reverse reconcilia-
tion scheme. Compared to case 2A, the maximum transmission distance decreases faster due to intensity fluctuation.
The maximum transmission distance will drop by about 20km even if the pulse intensity fluctuate 5%. Meanwhile,
the optimal dmax will always be the maximum value of its domain for uniform distribution.
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FIG. 10: Here, we optimize the secret key rate for uniform distribution. (a) Optimal secret key rate versus
transmission distance for different uniform distribution. (b) Optimal dmax versus transmission distance for different
uniform distribution.
Fig 10 shows the key rate optimization results for the Gaussian distribution. Here, we also consider the reverse
reconciliation scheme. The maximum transmission distance decreases rapidly when the intensity fluctuation increase.
Compared to the case of uniform distribution, the optimal dmax will be monotonic increasing as a function of distance.
When comparing these two model for the secret key rate, we find that QKD with Gaussian distributed variation will
have a lower key rate and transmission distance, since it always has a tail part for tagged Gaussian states.
VII. OUTLOOK FOR DECODING FLAWS OF CV QKD
In this section, we will introduce the detection stage for CV QKD. Especially, we will first briefly review the
homodyne detection scheme for CV QKD, and then introduce three decoding flaws in the CV QKD system. For each
flaw, we will propose feasible countermeasures and discuss the effect for CV QKD.
A. balanced homodyne detection
Here, we will firstly review the balanced homodyne detection. Fig 11 shows the homodyne detection to obtain the
quadrature values of the signal mode. The signal mode (xˆs,pˆs) is combined with the local oscillator (LO) (xˆLO,0) with
a balanced beamsolitter, The local oscillator works as a phase reference of the system to measure the quadratures xˆs
or pˆs, i.e., applying a phase shift of 0 to measure xˆs and pi/2 to measure pˆs. Suppose the phase shift is 0, the output
modes 1,2 read
xˆ1=(xˆs+xˆLO)/
√
2, (17)
pˆ1=pˆs/
√
2,
xˆ2=(−xˆs+xˆLO)/
√
2,
pˆ1=−pˆs/
√
2.
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FIG. 11: Here, we show the homodyne detection. The signal mode is combined with the local oscillator by a
balanced beamsplitter (ratio 50:50). The intensity differences between two output modes reveals the quadrature of
the signal mode.
The intensities of the output modes 1,2 read
I1=k/2(xˆ
2
1+pˆ
2
1+1), (18)
I2=k/2(xˆ
2
2+pˆ
2
2+1).
where the constant k contains all the prefactors in the photodiodes. The difference of two intensities reads
I1−I2=kxˆLOxˆs. (19)
Because the local oscillator is classical and its intensity kxˆ2LO can be measured without interruption, one can calculate
xˆs from the difference of the two measured intensities. Similarly, in order to measure the conjugate quadrature pˆs,
one should apply a phase shift of pi/2 to the local oscillator and follow the same progress.
B. incorrect beamsplitting ratio
In this section, we introduce one of the decoding flaws: incorrect beamsplitting ratio. In the perfect homodyne
detecion, the beam spitter should have a balanced splitting ratio of 50:50. By checking the specifications of a regular
fiber-based beamsplitter in [23], we find out the beamsplitting (coupling) ratio tolerance is ±1.5% for 1550 nm 50:50
coupler and ±6% for 480nm coupler. Here, we present the resulting homodyne detection results by unbalanced
homodyne detector. Suppose beam splitter has a ratio of (50+δ):(50−δ) , Eq.(16) can be written as
xˆ1=
√
1
2
+
δ
100
xˆs+
√
1
2
− δ
100
xˆLO, (20)
pˆ1=
√
1
2
+
δ
100
pˆs,
xˆ2=−
√
1
2
− δ
100
xˆs+
√
1
2
+
δ
100
xˆLO,
pˆ2=−
√
1
2
− δ
100
pˆs.
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Now the intensity differences become
I1−I2=k/2( δ
50
xˆ2s+4
√
1
2
+
δ
100
√
1
2
− δ
100
xˆLOxˆs− δ
50
xˆ2LO+
δ
50
pˆ2s) (21)
=k(
δ
100
xˆ2s+2
√
1
2
+
δ
100
√
1
2
− δ
100
xˆLOxˆs− δ
100
xˆ2LO+
δ
100
pˆ2s)
The detection result reads
xs′=
I1−I2
kxˆLO
(22)
=(
δ
100
xˆ2s
xˆLO
+2
√
1
2
+
δ
100
√
1
2
− δ
100
xˆs− δ
100
xˆLO+
δ
100
pˆ2s
xˆLO
)
Considering the fact xˆLO>>xˆs, the detection result can be shown as
xs′=2
√
1
2
+
δ
100
√
1
2
− δ
100
xˆs− δ
100
xˆLO (23)
Now, we have established the relation between detection result and beamspliiting ratio deviation δ. If δ is a constant,
the existing solution would be to include a variable attenuator in one output arm to balance the loss. However,
this experimental-based compensation scheme requires the prior device characterization and increases the system
complexity. By Eq.(23), we observe that the detected quadrature is a linear transformation of the input state’s
quadrature. Therefore, a straightforward software based countermeasure for constant beamsplitting ratio deviation
is that Alice and Bob can rescale and displace their data to obtain xs′=xs. On the other hand, If δ has a variance
Vδ, this beamsplitting ratio incorrectness will result in additional excess noise, Vδxˆ
2
LO/10000, in the detection stage,
which will decrease the secret key rate of CV QKD system.
C. the wavelength-dependence of the splitting ratio
In this section, we introduce the wavelength-dependence of the splitting ratio. As shown in [24], the wavelength
dependence of beam splitter can possibly open loophole to the quantum key distribution system. However, the
wavelength-dependence of the splitting ratio is quite small over a large band in the C-band. In other words, if Eve
cannot change the signal wavelength, this possible loophole can be removed. A simple solution would be to add a
1550 nm narrow bandpass filter before the beamsplitters. Typical 1550 narrow bandpass filter has a pass bandwidth
of 2 nm and a relative extinction ratio of 20 dB. Over this bandwidth, the effect of wavelength-dependence is less
than typical measurement error.
D. incorrect phase value
In this section, we will introduce the incorrect phase value applied to the local oscillator. Suppose when Bob apply
a phase of 0 to measure the quadrature x, an incorrect phase 0+θ is applied to the phase modulator. Given this
incorrect phase value, Eq.(16) can be written as
xˆ1=(xˆs+xˆLOcosθ)/
√
2, (24)
pˆ1=(pˆs+xˆLOsinθ)/
√
2,
xˆ2=(−xˆs+xˆLOcosθ)/
√
2,
pˆ1=(−pˆs+xˆLOsinθ)/
√
2.
The intensity difference between two pulses can be shown as
I1−I2=k(xˆLOxˆscosθ+xˆLOpˆssinθ). (25)
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Now the detection result can read
xs′=xˆscosθ+pˆssinθ. (26)
Therefore, a phase reamapping scheme [25] can be applied to the recorded input state. If the recorded input state
is rotated by a same phase θ, the detection state now exactly match with the input state. This phase-remapping
scheme in the reverse reconciliation of CV QKD can improve the mutual information between Alice and Bob so as to
increase the secret key rate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have studied the security of CVQKD in the presence of intensity fluctuating sources. Generally, We divide
current CVQKD systems into two cases for security proof. Depending on Alice’s realistic assumptions for the devices,
they might choose different security proof and obtain different secret key rates. In the case (1) , Alice can monitor the
intensity fluctuation for each pulse. She can revise her data and obtain almost the same secret key rate as what she can
obtain from the ideal CVQKD systems. Furthermore, by refined data analysis, the maximum transmission distance
can be observably improved. In the case (2), depending on the devices assumptions, we also divide CVQKD systems
into two subcases (2A) and (2B). In the case (2A), both Alice and Eve cannot obtain any intensity fluctuation
information of each pulse. Here, we prove the security based on Alice’s virtual implementation of classical data
processing. Besides, in the reverse reconciliation scheme, this virtual classical data processing will not affect Eve’s
information about Bob’s classical measurement results. In the case (2B), Eve could have the intensity fluctuation
side information of each pulse while Alice cannot. Here, we apply the tagging idea from [15]. We divide the signals
into tagged and untagged signals. The secret key will be only generated from untagged signals. After considering the
total error correction cost and privacy amplification, the security of case (2B) can be proved. In summary, our work
provides security proofs for CVQKD system with intensity fluctuating sources. Given different device assumptions,
we develop different security proofs. For the most conservative case (2B), we prove the security based on the tagging
idea. Our security proofs are simple to implement without any hardware adjustment for current CVQKD systems.
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Appendix A: Parameter estimation
With a series of correlated data ΓAX and ΓBX , Alice and Bob can estimate the channel parameters. Our model
of choice is a Gaussian channel with fixed transmittance T and excess noise . these values satisfy[18]:
VA=<x
2
A>, (A1)
VB=<x
2
B>=Tη(VA+)+1+vel,
COV (xA,xB)=<xAxB>=
√
TηVA,
where η and vel are the detection efficiency and electronic noise of homodyne detector that Bob needs to calibrate in
advance.
Then the parameter estimations for T and ε have the form [26]:
√
T=
<xAxB>√
η<x2A>
, (A2)
ε=(<xB−
√
TηxA>
2−1−vel)/T.
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Considering the realistic model, i.e.,Bob’s detector is not accessible to the Eve, the mutual information IAB and
χBE has the form [18, 27]
IAB=
1
2
log2
VA+1+χtot
1+χtot
(A3)
χBE=G(
λ1−1
2
)+G(
λ2−1
2
)−G(λ3−1
2
)−G(λ4−1
2
) (A4)
with
G(x)=(x+1)log2(x+1)−xlog2x; χtot=χline+χhom/T ; (A5)
χline=1/T−1+ε; χhom=(1+vel)/η−1; (A6)
λ21,2=
1
2
(A±
√
A2−4B); λ23,4=
1
2
(C±
√
C2−4D); (A7)
A=V 2(1−2T )+2T+T 2(V+χline)2; B=T 2(χline+1)2; (A8)
C=
V
√
B+T (V+χline)+Aχhom
T (V+χtot)
; D=
√
B
V+
√
Bχhom
T (V+χtot)
(A9)
Appendix B: equivalent transmittance and excess noise for a secure source
If Alice recording state is XA, The equivalent equivalent transmittance can be obtained according to Eq.(A2)√
Ts=
<xA1xA0>
<x2A0>
=
<
√
dxAxA>
<x2A>
,
=
<
√
dxAxA>
<x2A>
=<
√
d>
Since the average Ed=1, using Taylor expansion, we can obtain
√
d=[1+(d−1)]1/2=1+(d−1)
2
− (d−1)
2
8
+O((d−1)3) (B1)
Now, the equivalent transmittance can be shown as
Ts=<
√
d>2'(1−1
8
Vd)
2. (B2)
Next, the equivalent excess noise εs can be obtained from
1+Ts(VA+εs)=<x
2
A1>+1=<dX
2
A>+1=VA+1. (B3)
Therefore,
εs=
VA
Ts
−VA= VA
(1− 18Vd)2
−VA
'VA(1+1
4
Vd)−VA=1
4
VAVd.
Appendix C: equivalent transmittance and excess noise for a loosely controlled source
If Alice recording state is
√
dmaxXA, the equivalent equivalent transmittance can be obtained according to Eq.(A2)√
Ts=
<xA1xA0>
<x2A0>
=
<
√
dxA
√
dmaxxA>
<dmaxx2A>
,
=
√
dmax<
√
dxAxA>
dmax<x2A>
=<
√
d>/
√
dmax
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Since the average Ed=1, using Taylor expansion, we can obtain
√
d=[1+(d−1)]1/2=1+(d−1)
2
− (d−1)
2
8
+O((d−1)3) (C1)
Now, the equivalent transmittance can be shown as
Ts=<
√
d>2/dmax'(1−1
8
Vd)
2/dmax. (C2)
Next, the equivalent excess noise εs can be obtained from
1+Ts(dmaxVA+εs)=<x
2
A1>+1=<dX
2
A>+1=VA+1. (C3)
Therefore,
εs=
VA
Ts
−dmaxVA= dmaxVA
(1− 18Vd)2
−dmaxVA
'dmaxVA(1+1
4
Vd)−dmaxVA=1
4
VAVddmax.
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